Abstract. We propose and analyse a new countermeasure against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) for the AES encryption algorithm, based on permutation tables. As opposed to existing AES countermeasures, it does not use random masking. We prove that our new countermeasure is resistant against first-order DPA; we also show that it is quite efficient in practice.
Introduction
The AES [4] encryption algorithm is with DES the most widely used encryption algorithm. However, it is easy to see that without modification, AES is vulnerable to Differential Power Analysis as introduced by Kocher et al. in [6, 7] . A DPA attack consists in extracting information about the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm, by studying the power consumption of the electronic device during the execution of the algorithm. The attack was first described on the DES encryption scheme, but it was soon understood that the attack could easily be extended to other symmetrical cryptosystems such as the AES, and also to public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and Elliptic-Curves Cryptosystems [3] .
A common technique to protect secret-key algorithms against side-channel attacks consists in masking all data with a random integer, as suggested in [2] . The masked data and the random integer are then processed separately and eventually recombined at the end of the algorithm. An attacker trying to analyse power consumption at a single point will obtain only random values; therefore, the implementation will be secure against first-order Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In order to obtain valuable information about the key, the attacker must correlate the power consumption at multiple points during the execution of the algorithm; this is called a High Order Differential Power Analysis (HO-DPA); such attack usually requires a much larger number of power consumption curves, which makes it infeasible in practice if the number of executions is limited (for example, by using a counter). Many AES countermeasures have been described based on random masking [1, 5, 9, 10, 12] .
In this article we propose a different countermeasure against DPA for AES, based on permutation tables. The main difference with existing AES countermeasures is that it avoids random masking; in practice this can be an advantage because random masking is subject to numerous patents [7] . We prove that our countermeasure is resistant against first-order DPA (like the random masking countermeasure) and we show that its efficiency is comparable to that of the random masking countermeasure.
It works as follows: at initialisation time a randomised permutation table is generated in RAM; this permutation table is then applied to the message and to the key; then all intermediate variables that appear during the course of the algorithm remain in permuted form; eventually the inverse permutation is applied to obtain the resulting ciphertext.
We also describe a technique to reduce the RAM consumption of our permutation table countermeasure, at the cost of increasing the running time. Our technique is based on a compression scheme proposed in [11] for the classical random masking countermeasure; here we adapt this scheme to permutation tables. We show that this variant is also secure against first-order DPA. Finally, we also provide the result of implementations that show that our countermeasure is reasonably efficient in practice, as it is only roughly four times slower than the classical masking countermeasure, for a comparable RAM requirement (see Table 1 in Section 7 for a detailed comparison).
The AES encryption algorithm
In this section we recall the main operations involved in the AES algorithm. We refer to [4] for a full description. AES operates on a 4 × 4 array of bytes s i,j , termed the state. For encryption, each AES round (except the last) consists of four stages:
1. AddRoundKey: each byte of the state is xored with the round key k i,j , derived from the key schedule:
The pseudo-code for the inverse cipher is recalled in Figure 2 in Appendix. Finally, the key-schedule is based on the following operations: We refer to [4] for a full description of the key-schedule.
The Permutation Table Countermeasure
In this section we describe our basic countermeasure with permutation tables. A variant with a time-memory trade-off is described in Section 6. Our countermeasure consists in using a randomised representation of the state variables, using two independent 4-bit permutation tables p 1 and p 2 that are freshly generated before each new execution of the algorithm. More precisely, every intermediate byte x = x h x l , where x h is the high nibble and x l is the low nibble, will be represented in the following form: One defines a sequence of permutations s i for i ≥ 0 as follows:
where each k i ∈ {0, 1} 4 is randomly generated. The 4-bit permutation p 1 is then defined as p 1 := s n for some n (in practice, one can take n = 4). One applies the same procedure to generate the other table p 2 (with independently generated k i 's). Every intermediate byte x = x h x l that appear in AES is then represented as:
Therefore, P is a 8-bit permutation; its storage requires 16 bytes of RAM. In the following we explain how to use this permuted representation throughout the AES operations, so that the intermediate data are never manipulated in clear.
AddRoundKey
Given P (x) and P (y) we explain how to compute P (x⊕y) without manipulating x and y directly (since otherwise this would give a straightforward DPA attack). We define the following two 8-bit to 4-bit xor-tables; for all x ′ , y ′ ∈ {0, 1} 4 :
Those two tables require a total of 256 bytes in memory. Then given p 1 (x) and p 1 (y) one can compute p 1 (x ⊕ y) using:
for all x, y ∈ {0, 1} 4 . Similarly, we have:
Using those two tables we define the following function for all x ′ , y ′ ∈ {0, 1} 8 , where
Then given P (x) and P (y), one can compute P (x ⊕ y) as:
The AddRoundKey operation can then be implemented as:
where
It is therefore necessary to use the permuted representation for the round keys. We further describe how this is done by modifying the key-schedule operations (see sections 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11).
SubBytes
Let S be the AES SBOX. We define the following randomised permutation S ′ :
Given P (x), the permuted representation of S(x) is then computed as:
The SubBytes operation on the permuted state variables can then be computed using the table S ′ as follows:
The randomised table S ′ (x) requires 256 bytes in RAM.
ShiftRows
No modification is required.
MixColumns
Using 03 · x = (02 · x) ⊕ x, the MixColumns operation can be written as follows (first line):
,c Therefore, we must be able to compute P (02·x) from P (x). For any x = x h x l ∈ {0, 1} 8 , from x = (0 x l ) ⊕ (x h 0) we have:
and using equation (1), we obtain:
Therefore, for all x ′ ∈ {0, 1} 8 where
, we define the following two tables (4-bit to 8-bit):
which gives for any x l , x h ∈ {0, 1} 4 :
Using equations (2) and (3), given P (x) = p 2 (x h ) p 1 (x l ), we can therefore compute P (02 · x) as follows:
so that for any x ∈ {0, 1} 8 :
The first line of the MixColumns operation with permuted data can therefore be written as:
and the other three lines are implemented analogously. The storage of the two ML and MH tables requires 32 bits of RAM.
InvShiftRows
The algorithm remains the same.
InvSubBytes
This is similar to the SubBytes algorithm: we define the following randomised permutation S ′−1 :
Therefore, the InvSubBytes operation on the permuted state variables is computed using table S ′−1 (x) as follows:
Note that one can generate the randomised table S ′−1 (x) from S(x) only, so that it is not necessary to store S −1 (x) in ROM, using the fact that:
InvMixColumns
The first line of the InvMixColumns operation is as follows:
We have the following relations in GF(2 8 ):
Therefore only two tables for computing the multiplication by 09 and 0c are required, from which multiplication by 0b, 0d and 0e can be computed without additional tables. More precisely, for all x ∈ {0, 1} 4 , we build the following 4-bit to 8-bit tables:
Storing those four tables requires 64 bytes in RAM. Then, as in section 3.5, writing
, we obtain:
As previously we denote:
Using equations (5), we also denote:
The first line of the InvMixColumns operation can then be rewritten as follows:
and the other three lines are rewritten analogously.
SubWord
The SubWord operation on the modified state variables is implemented like the SubByte operation.
RotWord
The RotWord operation remains unmodified.
Xor with Rcon
Let R(i) = 02
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. We have R(0) = 01 and R(i) = 02 · R(i − 1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. Therefore, letting R ′ (i) := P (R(i)), we have:
Therefore the Rcon constant can be computed using the function D 2 (x) defined in section 3.5.
Security
In this section we show that our countermeasure in resistant against first-order DPA. This is due to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For a fixed key and input message, every intermediate byte that is computed in the course of the randomised AES algorithm has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} 8 .
Proof. The proof follows directly from the fact that any intermediate AES data x is represented as P (x), where P (x h x l ) = p 2 (x h ) p 1 (x l ) is the randomised permutation. From the construction of p 1 , p 2 , this implies that P (x) is randomly distributed in {0, 1} 8 .
⊓ ⊔
The previous lemma implies that an attacker who makes statistics about power-consumption at a single point gets only random values; hence, the countermeasure is resistant against first-order DPA (like the random masking countermeasure). In order to obtain valuable information about the key, the attacker must correlate the power consumption at multiple points during the execution of the algorithm; this is called a High Order Differential Power Analysis (HO-DPA); such attack usually requires a much larger number of power consumption curves, which makes it infeasible in practice if the number of executions is limited (for example, by using a counter).
A Compression Scheme
A very nice compression scheme for SBOX tables has been proposed in [11] . This compression scheme works for SBOXes with a random mask; we recall it in this section.
1 Then in Section 6 we show how to adapt it to our permutation table countermeasure.
Let S(x) for x ∈ {0, 1} 8 be a 8-bit to 8-bit SBOX. One defines S 1 (x) and S 2 (x) such that S(x) = S 2 (x) S 1 (x) for all x ∈ {0, 1} 8 , where S 1 (x) and S 2 (x) are 4-bit values. Let r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} 8 and s ∈ {0, 1} 4 be random masks, and let define the randomised table:
which is a 8-bit to 4-bit table. Let x ′ = x ⊕ (r 1 ⊕ r 2 ) be a masked data; we have from (6):
which gives:
Therefore given the masked data x ′ one can obtain a masked S 1 (x) and a masked S 2 (x), by using the randomised table T . The advantage is that the size of T is only half the size of a classically randomised SBOX table; here the storage of T requires only 128 bytes of RAM instead of 256 bytes for a classically randomised AES SBOX. More precisely, the algorithm is as follows:
8 and r ′ = (s ⊕ t) s.
Here we add an additional masking step with t so that the values u and v are not masked with the same nibble s; from equations (7) and (8), we obtain that the value returned by TableLookUp is such that y = S(x) ⊕ r ′ . It is easy to see that this countermeasure is resistant against first-order DPA, as all the variables that appear in the TableLookUp function are uniformly distributed. Note that the tables S 1 and S 2 are only stored in ROM; they don't need to be randomised because in the TableLookUp algorithm those tables are accessed at point x ′ which is already randomised.
It is also easy to see that the countermeasure can be generalised to any SBOX input and output size. Moreover, one can obtain a better compression factor by splitting S(x) into more shares; for example, a 8-bit SBOX could be split into 8 tables (one for each output bit); then the resulting randomised T table would be 8 times smaller, at the cost of increasing the running time for every table look-up.
Time memory Trade-offs
In this section we describe three time-memory trade-offs. The goal is to reduce the RAM requirement of the permutation table countermeasure described in Section 3, for implementation on low-cost devices, at the cost of increasing the running time. The main time-memory tradeoff is based on the SBOX compression scheme recalled in the previous section. The second idea consists in using a single XOR table XT
The third idea consists in removing tables TL, TH, RL and RH, by using a "Double-And-Add" approach. In Section 7 we describe the results of practical implementations of these time-memory trade-offs.
Compressed SBOX
The compression scheme of [11] recalled in the previous section was used for random masking; here we show how to adapt this compression scheme to our permutation table countermeasure.
We define a new permutation
2 are 4-bit permutations tables which are generated like p 1 and p 2 . As previously, we write:
where S 1 (x) and S 2 (x) are 4-bit nibbles. We then define a randomised table:
The randomised table T (x ′ ) is a 8-bit to 4-bit table; therefore, its storage requires 128 bits in memory, instead of 256 bytes for the randomised table S ′ (x ′ ) in Section 3.3. Writing x ′ = P (x), we obtain from equation (9):
This shows that given P (x) we can compute p 1 (S 1 (x)) using randomised table T and table S 2 stored in ROM. Similarly, writing x ′ = P ′ (P (x)), we obtain from equation (9):
This shows that given P (x) we can compute p 2 (S 2 (x)) using randomised table T and table S 1 stored in ROM. Therefore, given P (x) we can compute:
using the following operations:
Given the tables P , P ′ , T and denoting F (x ′ ) = TableLookUp(x ′ , T, P, P ′ ), the SubBytes operation on the permuted state variables is computed as follows:
The 
Single XOR table
In Section 3.2 two 8-bit to 4-bit xor-tables are defined. In this section, we show that it is sufficient to define only one 8-bit to 4-bit xor-table. As in Section 3.2, we define:
We also define the 4-bit to 4-bit permutations:
and we store those two permutation tables in RAM. Then we can define the function:
From equations (10) and (11) we obtain that for all x h , y h ∈ {0, 1} 4 :
Therefore, the XT table.
Double and Add for InvMixColumns
In this section we show how to avoid the four tables TL, TH, RL and RH, using a Double and Add method. More precisely, using the existing D 2 function (see equation (4)) we define the following functions:
Therefore no additional table is required beyond the already defined ML and MH tables. The first line of the InvMixColumns operation can then be rewritten as follows: Therefore, the three previous time-memory tradeoffs are secure against firstorder DPA.
Implementation
We summarise in Table 1 the timings observed and RAM needed for each AES operation. The timings are based on an implementation in C on a 2 GHz laptop under Linux. The RAM requirements are based on Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix. These timings show that the new countermeasure is reasonably efficient, as it is only roughly four times slower than AES with masking countermeasure, for a comparable amount of memory. We note that the time-memory tradeoffs enable to spare 272 bytes in RAM compared to our basic permutation 
